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I. BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2011, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave
Camp, Republican from Michigan, released a discussion draft of a tax
reform plan that included a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to
25% and the adoption of a territorial tax system in which most active foreign
profits of multinational corporations would be exempt from U.S. tax.1 In
* B.A. (Economics), Harvard College; Ph.D. (Economics), Northwestern University. Chief
Economist, Tax Analysts. Portions of this article are derived from an earlier publication: Martin A.
Sullivan, An Automatic Brake on Profit Shifting in a Territorial System, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 502
(2012). Copyright © 2012 Tax Analysts. Reprinted with the permission of Tax Analysts. This
article is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama
Administration symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts.
1. For the draft statutory language, see COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, WAYS & MEANS
DISCUSSION DRAFT
(Oct
26,
2011)
(Chairman
Dave
Camp),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/discussion_draft.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT LANGUAGE].
For a twenty-seven page technical explanation, see COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE WAYS & MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH A
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order to meet the self-imposed constraint of maintaining revenue neutrality
for all changes to tax laws relating to the taxation of foreign profits,2 the plan
included several provisions to offset the revenue cost of exempting foreign
profits from U.S. tax. These included: a mandatory 5.25% tax on existing
unrepatriated foreign earnings (whether or not repatriated); proposals to tax
foreign income in situations where aggressive transfer pricing practices are
likely (for example, when intangible assets generate high rates of profit or
when profits are booked in low-tax jurisdictions); the taxation of 5% of
foreign profit upon repatriation; and thin capitalization rules to disallow U.S.
deductions for interest above certain prescribed limits.3 The last two
features are the focus of this Article.
Often referred to as the “5 percent haircut,”4 the inclusion of 5% of
otherwise exempt active foreign source income in taxable profits is similar
to provisions in the approach adopted by several other nations with territorial
systems, including Japan, Germany, and France.5 Chairman Camp’s
explanation of the proposal states that it is intended as “a substitute for the
disallowance of deductions for expenses incurred to generate exempt foreign
income.”6 Many commentators have asserted that in adopting a territorial
tax system the United States should adhere to the matching principle and
disallow deductions related to foreign profits exempt from U.S. tax.7
PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION SYSTEM FOR THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME (Oct. 26, 2011) (
Chairman Dave Camp), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/final_te_—
_ways_and_means_participation_exemption_discussion_draft.pdf
[hereinafter
TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION]
2. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, SUMMARY OF WAYS & MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT:
PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION (TERRITORIAL) SYSTEM (Chairman Dave Camp), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/summary_of_ways_and_means_draft_option.pdf
[hereinafter PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION] (“The Committee does not believe that domestic base
broadening should be used to finance international tax relief, and vice versa.”).
3. See PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Vive la Petite Difference: Camp, Obama, and Territoriality
Reconsidered, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 617, 618 (2012).
5. J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-33-11, BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME
(2011), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3793 [hereinafter
JCX-33-11].
6. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 1, at 18. Other expenses besides interest incurred
in the United States that might be subject to allocation are research and development expense and
general and administrative expense. Issues surrounding the allocation of these expenses are not
discussed in this article.
7. See, e.g., JCX-33-11, supra note 5, at 9 (“A territorial system that permits a deduction for an
expense incurred to produce exempt foreign income may not achieve a matching of taxable income
items with deductible expense items.”); Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Paul W.
Oosterhuis, Partner of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/oosterhuissrm1117.pdf [hereinafter Statement of
Oosterhuis] (“[T]ax policy should be guided by the fundamental matching principle that an expense
should be deductible against the tax base that will include revenue arising from that expense.”);
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Because it is generally believed that all components of any firm’s finances
are interdependent (i.e., that money is fungible) and that it is therefore not
possible to assign or trace interest costs to a single component of a firm’s
operations, these commentators have proposed that a multinational’s
worldwide interest expense paid to third-party lenders be allocated across
jurisdictions using assets as an allocation factor.8 If the United States
adopted such a rule, the location of borrowing would no longer affect the
size of the U.S. interest deduction. Furthermore, related-party borrowing
from subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions would no longer be a threat to the
U.S. tax base.9
Elsewhere in the Discussion Draft, under the heading of “Prevention of
Base Erosion,” Chairman Camp includes a two-pronged thin-capitalization

PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH:
PROPOSAL
TO
FIX
AMERICA’S
TAX
SYSTEM
(2005),
available
at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/index.html
[hereinafter
PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY PANEL] (“Under the Simplified Income Tax Plan, the active business earnings of foreign
affiliates would not be subject to U.S. tax at the business level. Accordingly, business expenses that
are attributable to these foreign earnings should not be allowed as a deduction against U.S. taxable
income.”); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni, & Stephen E. Shay, Designing a U.S. Exemption
System for Foreign Income When the Treasury Is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397, 448 (2012) (“A
general principle of the U.S. income tax is that expenses allocable to exempt income should not be
allowed as income tax deductions unless Congress deliberately chooses to increase the exempt
activity’s tax advantage by reducing the effective U.S. tax rate below zero.”).
8. Many prominent authorities have proposed that territorial systems should include interest
allocation by assets. See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 190 ( 2005); PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 7, at 241
(“Interest expense should only be disallowed to the extent that the U.S. operations of a U.S.
multinational are more heavily leveraged than the multinational’s foreign operations; that is, interest
expense should be disallowed to the extent that the ratio of foreign debt to foreign assets is lower
than the worldwide ratio of debt to assets.”); Michael J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solution for the
Income Tax Treatment of Interest Expenses, 62 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 486, 491 (2008) (“A far
better policy [than allowing multinationals to deduct interest wherever they borrow] . . . would be
for all countries to allow interest deductions on borrowing in proportion to the assets in that country
regardless of where the borrowing takes place.”); Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis,
Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 771,
781 (2001) (“A system that allocates interest expense first to interest income (whether or not eligible
for exemption) with the remaining interest expense allocated to each category of income pro rata
based on assets, but taking worldwide assets into account, would be a better starting point than
current law.”).
9. Like aggressive transfer pricing, related-party debt is used by multinational corporations to
shift profits from high-tax to low-tax countries. H. David Rosenbloom, Banes of an Income Tax:
Legal Fictions, Elections, Hypothetical Determinations, and Related-Party Debt, 32 TAX NOTES
INT’L 989 (2003); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: What Hath Britain Wrought? 61 TAX NOTES
INT’L 7 (2011). Rosenbloom calls related-party debt “a principal tool of the tax planner.”
Rosenbloom, supra, at 997. Sheppard refers to it as “the big enchilada of easily manufactured
income and expense.” Sheppard, supra, at 9.
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rule.10 Under this rule, U.S. deductions for interest expense would be
disallowed if a multinational corporation exceeds thresholds set in both a
“relative leverage test” and a “percentage of adjusted taxable income test.”11
Under the relative leverage test, U.S. interest deductions are disallowed in
the same proportion that a multinational’s U.S. debt-equity ratio exceeds its
worldwide debt-equity ratio. Under the percentage of adjusted taxable
income test, U.S. interest deductions are disallowed to the extent they
exceed an unspecified fixed percentage (perhaps, for example, 30%) of
“adjusted taxable income.” Adjusted taxable income is taxable income
increased by deductible losses, interest, depreciation, and amortization.12
Even though the Discussion Draft presents the two provisions
separately, it is difficult conceptually and in practice to disentangle interest
allocation rules (or a proxy for those rules), on the one hand, and thin
capitalization rules, on the other. It might be said that interest allocation
rules exist for proper income measurement and thin capitalization rules are
designed to prevent high levels of tax-motivated domestic leverage,
especially when multinationals achieve an advantageous redistribution of
interest expense across jurisdictions through related-party loans. But about
the two policy goals—properly measuring income and limiting related-party
loans—it should be noted that the latter is only worthwhile if it helps achieve
the former.
Even if they are unvarnished tax-motivated artificial
transactions, related-party loans need not be disdained—and, as shall be
discussed below, perhaps should even be encouraged if income
measurement goals are met through well-functioning interest allocation
rules.
In November 17, 2011, congressional testimony on the Discussion
Draft, Paul Oosterhuis argued that if the 5 percent haircut is a proxy for
interest allocation rules then the inclusion of both the haircut and the thin
capitalization rules are not necessary given that interest allocation rules and
thin capitalization have largely the same effect.13 In fact, allocation of
worldwide interest by gross assets is practically identical to the first prong of
Camp’s thin capitalization rule, the relative leverage test.14 The only
difference is that the allocation rule determines domestic interest deduction
while the relative leverage test caps otherwise allowable domestic interest
deduction. To illustrate, suppose a U.S. multinational had worldwide assets
of $3,000, worldwide debt of $1,000, worldwide interest costs of $100, and

10. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 1, at 32.
11. Id. at 35.
12. Id. Adjusted taxable income is more a measure of cash flow than of income.
13. Statement of Oosterhuis, supra note 7.
14. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Should the Camp Territorial Plan Include a 5
Percent Haircut?, 136 TAX NOTES 359 (2012).
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equal assets at home and abroad. Its interest deductions in the United States
under allocation rules would be $50, computed as 50% of worldwide
interest. By the balance sheet identity, the worldwide capital structure
consists one-third of debt and two-thirds of equity. Under the relative
leverage test, U.S. interest deductions would be capped at $50, computed as
interest attributable to domestic debt that should be equal to one-third of
$1,500 of domestic assets.
Whether originating with the intent of implementing the matching
principle, restricting the use of transactions considered abusive, or simply
raising revenue, interest allocation rules (or equivalent limitations based on
debt-equity ratios) will receive a great deal of attention in the debate about
possible adoption of a territorial system by the United States. This Article
explores the economic characteristics of interest allocation rules. Part II
shows that in a world where all nations have territorial tax systems
disparities in effective tax rates can be significantly reduced or eliminated if
all nations adopt interest allocation rules with assets as the allocation factor.
Part III explains why concerns that the competitiveness of U.S.
multinationals will be damaged if the United States unilaterally adopts
interest allocation rules are overstated. Part IV argues that replacing gross
profits for assets as the allocation factor in an interest allocation rule would
yield additional benefits. Part V summarizes and concludes with the
proposal that if the U.S. adopts a territorial system it should also adopt,
unilaterally if necessary, an interest allocation rule with gross profits as the
allocation factor.
II. MULTILATERAL ADOPTION OF INTEREST ALLOCATION BY ASSETS
A. Preliminaries
To quantify the impact of different rules concerning the deductibility of
interest, this section and the following section calculate marginal effective
tax rates on capital. If marginal effective tax rates on capital are equal, the
after-tax return on capital is reduced proportionately and decisions about
making new (marginal) investments are not distorted by taxes. Tax rules
that do not distort the allocation of capital are called “neutral.” In the
absence of externalities, neutral taxes are considered economically efficient
because they do not change the allocation of capital from what would exist
in a world without taxes. It is important to distinguish marginal effective tax
rates on capital used here from other effective tax rates, in particular from
effective tax rates that appear in financial statements and are widely reported
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in the financial press. Those tax rates measure the level of tax on all income
from all capital (not just marginal investment), and they do not take into
account returns on capital financed by debt.
The main points will be illustrated by comparing the effective tax rate of
two hypothetical multinational corporations, one based in the United States
(US MNC), where the federal statutory corporate tax rate is 35%, and the
other based outside the United States (Foreign MNC), in a jurisdiction where
the statutory rate is 25%. Both multinationals have investments earning
$100 in their home countries and $100 in a third country (called Source)
where the corporate statutory rate is 15% tax rates. Debt incurred by both
firms generates interest deductions of $100. To assess the economic effect
of interest deductions, marginal effective tax rates are calculated for these
two firms’ new investments in Source that generates an additional $100 of
profit and is financed with debt that generates an additional $50 of interest
deductions. For simplicity, it is also assumed there is a uniform rate of
interest on all debt and that it is equal to a uniform rate of profit on assets.
Later, that latter assumption will be relaxed.
B. US MNC’s Choice of Domestic versus Foreign Investment
Allocating interest by assets improves economic efficiency because it
narrows the spreads on effective rates compared to what they would be
without allocation rules, as the following calculations illustrate.
In a territorial system without interest allocation rules, if US MNC
borrows in the United States to invest in the United States, it would generate
$100 of income and $50 interest deductions in the United States.15 With
taxable income of $50, and tax of $17.50, the marginal effective tax rate on
capital would be 17.5%.16
Without interest allocation rules, if US MNC borrows in the United
States to invest in Source, it pays $15 of tax on $100 of income in Source
and deducts $50 of interest in the United States, reducing US taxes by
$17.50.17 The net worldwide tax change from the investment is negative
2.5.18 Dividing the marginal tax effect by the marginal income yields an
effective tax rate of -2.5%.19 A negative tax rate signifies that a taxpayer is
receiving a subsidy from governments rather than being taxed. The 20%
difference in marginal effective tax rates provides US MNC with a
significant incentive to invest in Source instead of the United States.20
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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If the United States adopted a territorial system with interest allocation
rules, the tax advantage for foreign over domestic investment would be
reduced. Before the new investment, the domestic share of assets is half, the
foreign share is half, and overall interest is $100.21 $50 of interest is
deductible in the US and $50 is deductible in Source.22 US tax is $17.5 and
foreign tax is $7.5.23
With new domestic investment, the domestic share of assets is twothirds, the foreign share is one-third, and overall interest is $150.24 $100 of
interest is deductible in the United States and $50 is deductible in Source.25
Domestic taxable income is $100 and domestic tax is $35.26 Foreign tax is
unchanged.27 There is $17.5 of additional tax on $100 of new investment
income.28 The marginal effective tax rate on domestic investment is
17.5%.29
With new foreign investment, the domestic share of assets is one-third,
the foreign share is two-thirds, and overall interest is $150.30 Fifty dollars of
interest is deductible US and $100 is deductible foreign.31 Domestic taxable
income is unchanged by the new investment. Foreign taxable income is
$100.32 There is $7.5 of additional tax on $100 of new investment income.
The marginal effective tax rate on foreign investment is 7.5%.33
For a U.S. multinational corporation, interest allocation rules reduce the
tax advantage of foreign over domestic investment. The original differential
in effective tax rates of 20% (-2.5% for foreign versus 17.5% for domestic)
is reduced to 10% (7.5% for foreign versus 17.5% for domestic). Interest
allocation rules cannot erase the tax benefits due to differences in tax rates
across countries, but they can significantly reduce the enlargement of these
absence of interest allocation rules are presented by Graetz, supra note 8, at 488, and by
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 7, at 133 (“Although territorial tax systems are designed
to impose no home country tax on active foreign earnings, the goal of these systems is not to
subsidize foreign investment.”).
21. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
22. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
23. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
24. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
25. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
26. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
27. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
28. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
29. See infra tbl.1, panel B.1.
30. See infra tbl.1, panel B.2.
31. See infra tbl.1, panel B.2.
32. See infra tbl.1, panel B.2.
33. See infra tbl.1, panel B.2.
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differentials due to mismatching income and expense. In addition, they
remove the specter of the United States government going far beyond merely
exempting foreign profits from tax but providing significant subsidies for
foreign investment. In this example, the U.S. subsidy of $17.50 more than
offsets additional foreign tax of $15.
C. The Competitiveness of US MNC versus Foreign MNC
As shown above, without interest allocation rules, a US MNC investing
abroad faces a marginal effective tax rate of -2.5%.34 If foreign MNC makes
the same investment in Source and borrows at home, it pays $15 of tax on
$100 of income in Source and deducts $50 of interest in its home country at
25%, reducing foreign taxes by $12.5.35 The net worldwide tax change from
the investment is $2.50.36 Dividing the marginal tax effect by the marginal
income yields an effective tax rate of positive 2.5%.37 Thus, without interest
allocation rules, Foreign MNC has a marginal effective tax rate that is 5%
higher than its U.S. competitor.
Multilateral adoption of interest allocation rules would level the playing
field for competing multinationals.
As shown above, with interest
allocations rules, US MNC faces a marginal effective tax rate of 7.5% on
new investment in Source.38 If Foreign MNC makes the same investment,
gross profit in Source increases by $100.39 Interest allocated to its home
country remains unchanged (half of $100 before, one-third of $150 after)
and its deductions in Source increase by $50 (half of $100 before, two-thirds
of $150 after).40 So additional tax in Source is 15% of the difference
between $100 of additional gross income and $50 of additional interest
deductions.41 The marginal effective tax rate for Foreign MNC is 7.5%,
equal to that of US MNC making the same investment.42
And so in addition to reducing the tax advantages of foreign over
domestic investment for multinationals, multilateral adoption of interest
allocation would equalize the effective tax rates of multinationals investing
in source countries regardless of the multinationals’ home jurisdiction.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
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III. UNILATERAL ADOPTION OF INTEREST ALLOCATION RULES
A. Multinational Competitiveness
Despite the wide acceptance of the matching principle in theory, few
countries have put it into practice by implementing effective interest
limitations.43 The United Kingdom, for example, has a “debt cap” that limits
interest deductions in the United Kingdom not to a share of worldwide
interest related to U.K. business (as would an interest allocation rule), but to
total interest paid by a multinational to external lenders.44 And looking to
the future, if the United States did adopt interest allocation rules, there is
good reason be skeptical about whether other nations would follow.
Coordinating international tax rules is difficult in practice, especially since
businesses, anti-tax organizations, and many governments themselves prefer
that governments differentiate their tax rules in order to compete for mobile
international capital. Therefore, it is important to consider the implications
of the United States adopting territorial taxation—as most other major
nations have—while implementing strict interest allocation rules that most
other nations have shunned. Several commentators have expressed concern
that U.S. multinational corporations would suffer a competitive disadvantage
relative to foreign multinationals.45 Others have stated that, as a matter of

43. Diane Hay, Introduction, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN PROFITS 2009–2010 12 (Philip Baker
ed., 2009) (“Most countries with a territorial system have some form of expense allocation, even
though these are not always particularly effective in practice.”).
44. Neil Edwards & Stephen Taylor, Debt Cap-In General, in TAXATION OF FOREIGN PROFITS
2009–2010, supra note 43, at 122 (“[T]he interest deductibility is not restricted to the overall gearing
levels of the worldwide group but the total finance cost of the whole group; there is no restriction
based in the proportion of profits earned, and there is no specific restrictions on finance cost relating
to borrowings used to acquire finance subsidiaries.”).
45. See Hearing on the Need for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs for American Workers Before the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (submission by National Foreign Trade Council of Written
Comments for the Hearing Record), available at http://www.nftc.org/default/Tax%20Policy/State
ment%20for%20the%20Record%20to%20WMs%20Committee%20May%202011.pdf.
It is also important to note that, in adopting a territorial system, the U.S. should not
deny deductions for interest or other expenses allocated to foreign income. Such a
limitation would be inconsistent with the tax systems of every major industrialized
country and would put worldwide American companies at a competitive disadvantage in
both the U.S. and foreign markets.
Id.; Tax Reform Options: International Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong.
12 (2011) (testimony of Scott M. Naatjes, Vice President and General Tax Counsel, Cargill,
Incorporated), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20of%
20Scott%20Naatjes.pdf.
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principle, interest should be deductible somewhere, and have asserted that
this principle would be violated if the United States denied deductions for
interest incurred in the United States, given that countries where foreign
income is earned rarely allow deductions for such expense.46
The first row of Table 3 shows the effect on US MNC in a territorial
system where, because the United States unilaterally adopts an expense
allocation rule, some of its interest expense is not deducted anywhere.47 As
previously, US MNC invests in Source, earns $100 of gross income, and
borrows in the United States, but the $50 of interest incurred in the United
States on debt used to finance that investment is not deductible in the United
States because the allocation formula does not increase the allowable interest
deduction. And Source does not allow deductions for interest expense on
debt not incurred by a business inside its borders. So $100 of income in
Source is taxed at that country’s 15% rate. This puts the U.S. multinational
at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis Foreign MNC that can deduct
expense at its home country tax rate of 25%, as shown by comparing the first
and last rows of Table 3.48

Some have proposed keeping the U.S. expense allocation rules even if the United States adopts a
territorial tax system, and then making the allocated expenses permanently non-deductible. Not
surprisingly, that could actually raise U.S. tax revenue relative to our current system. But it would
do so with a tax cost based upon rules unrelated to non-U.S. income or business performance,
making business planning more difficult and U.S. MNCs even less competitive.
Id.; BUS. ROUNDTABLE, TAKING ACTION FOR AMERICA: A CEO PLAN FOR JOBS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
18
(2012),
available
at
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studiesreports/downloads/20120307_BRT_Taking_Action_for_America.pdf (“The U.S. system should not
deny domestic deductions for expenses not directly allocable to foreign earnings.”); Robert H.
Dilworth, Tax Reform: International Tax Issues and Some Proposals, 35 INT’L TAX J. 5, 52 (2009)
(“Other OECD member countries have to date, either deliberately or accidentally, opted for a system
that reduces the residence country tax burden on foreign business activity (competitiveness) rather
than perfect matching of expense and intended income.”).
46. Ways and Means Committee Counsel Ray Beeman stated that there was concern that interest
allocation rules could create “stateless expenses.” KPMG TAX GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE, A
DISCUSSION OF CHAIRMAN CAMP’S TERRITORIAL TAX REFORM DRAFT 5 (2011) available at
http://www.kpmginstitutes.com/tax-governance-institute/insights/2011/pdf/tgi-exec-sum-territorialtax.pdf; see also JCX-33-11, supra note 5, at 9 (“Disallowing a deduction for the expense may,
however, cause the expense not to be deductible in any country (because the country in which the
income is derived also may not permit a deduction).”); Statement of Oosterhuis, supra note 7, at 18
(“[A]ll interest expense represents a real cost of earning income and should be deductible against
taxable income in some jurisdiction.”); Paul W. Oosterhuis, The Evolution of U.S. International Tax
Policy: What Would Larry Say?, 112 TAX NOTES 87, 94 (2006).
47. See infra tbl.3, row 1.
48. See infra tbl.3.
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TABLE 3
Various Response of US MNC to Unilateral Adoption
of Interest Allocation Rules by the United States
Investor
US MNC
US MNC
US MNC
US MNC

Location
of Net
Debt
US
Source
Other
Other

Compare to:
Foreign
Foreign
MNC
Home

Location of
Deduction
nowhere
Source
Other
Other

Rate at Which
Interest Deducted
15%
20%
25%

Tax Value of
Deduction
$0
$7.50
$10.00
$12.50

Marginal
Effective Tax
Rate
15.0%
7.5%
5.0%
2.5%

Foreign
Home

25%

$12.50

2.5%

But just as water runs downhill, it is only natural to expect that US
MNC will seek to minimize its taxes, especially if tax planning does little to
interfere with business operations. US MNC could qualify for foreign
deductions by having its affiliate in Source borrow instead of the U.S. parent
company doing the borrowing. This, however, may raise US MNC’s overall
financing costs.49 Alternatively, US MNC could itself lend to a foreign
affiliate and then the foreign affiliate could deduct the $50 of interest at
Source’s 15% rate. Intra-company lending has no impact on the calculation
of allowable deductions in the United States, so U.S. taxes are not affected.50
Tax in Source is 15% of $50 of net taxable income.51 The effective tax rate
is 7.5%, as shown in the second line of Table 3.52 That is not as favorable as
the 2.5% effective rate faced by Foreign MNC when it was not subject to
interest allocations, but it is a considerable improvement over the 15% rate
when US MNC did not respond to the changing rules.
US MNC could even further improve its tax situation in the face of U.S.
unilateral adoption of interest allocation rules by shifting debt used to
finance investment in Source to another jurisdiction where it has operations

49. See Statement of Oosterhuis, supra note 7, at 19 (“For a variety of reasons, it is frequently
easier, more efficient, and more affordable for a U.S. company to borrow on behalf of its entire
worldwide group that for its [foreign affiliate] to borrow on its own behalf.”); Graetz, supra note 8,
at 491 n.29 (“While corporations may have considerable control over where they locate their
borrowing, that control may not be absolute: [a source country], for example, may not have welldeveloped capital markets for corporate borrowing. And there may be economies of scale from
concentrating borrowing in one or a few places.”).
50. See I.R.C. § 1031(f)(1)(B) (2006). If a taxpayer exchanges property with a related person
(i.e., two corporations that are members of the same group), gain or loss is not recognized.
51. See supra tbl.3.
52. See supra tbl.3, row 2.
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and the tax rate is higher than in Source.53 As before, US MNC borrows in
the United States to partially finance investment in Source. As before, the
borrowing generates $50 of non-deductible interest in the United States and
$100 of income taxed at 15% in Source. If US MNC makes a related-party
loan to an affiliate in a country with a 20% tax rate, its effective tax rate on
marginal investment is reduced to 5%.54 Related-party lending that shifted
the interest cost to a country with a 25% rates (the statutory rate in the home
country of Foreign MNC) would entirely eliminate US MNC’s tax
advantage.55 Related-party loans to affiliates can be used to shift interest
deductions outside the United States, ensuring that the interest is deductible
somewhere and reducing—perhaps even eliminating—the tax advantage
Foreign MNC enjoys over US MNC with respect to investment in Source.56
B. Possibility of a Double Dip
If the United States adopts interest allocation rules, neither issuance of
related-party debt nor changes in the location of third-party debt will affect
interest deductions in the United States. On the other hand, if other
countries do not adopt interest allocation rules, they generally will continue
to allow interest to be deducted on borrowing by affiliates operating inside
their borders. This is an opportunity for tax arbitrage. Multinationals
operating in the United States will have a powerful incentive to shift
borrowing into foreign jurisdictions.
To see this, consider US MNC in its “before” state, where it had equalsized operations in both the United States and Source.57 Under U.S
allocation rules, 50% of the $100 in worldwide interest is deductible in the
United States, no matter where net debt is located. Assuming no foreign thin
capitalization rules, every dollar of worldwide interest expense in excess of
$50 that US MNC locates outside of the United States is deducted twice.58
For example, if US MNC locates $80 of its $100 of net interest outside the
United States, it can deduct $50 in the United States and $80 in foreign
jurisdictions. So, contrary to fear that less than $100 of a multinational’s
interest will be deductible anywhere if interest allocation rules are adopted

53. See Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 8, at 781 n.18.
54. See supra tbl.3, row 3.
55. See supra tbl.3, row 4.
56. In his congressional testimony, Oosterhuis emphasizes the importance of related-party loans
to minimize the impact of proposed U.S. interest limitations: “[A]n interest disallowance provision
should allow domestic corporations that borrow from unrelated parties to lend to their foreign
affiliates with the same consequence as if the [foreign affiliate] borrowed directly from a third party
with a parent guarantee.” Statement of Oosterhuis, supra note 7, at 19.
57. See infra tbl.2, col. 1.
58. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Effect of Interest Allocation Rules in a
Territorial System, 136 TAX NOTES 1098, 1100 (2012) [hereinafter Interest Allocation Rules].
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unilaterally, there is a strong possibility that some multinational interest will
be deducted twice.59 In our example, US MNC can reduce its foreign taxes
without increasing its overall leverage simply by lending to its foreign
affiliate. U.S. taxes are unchanged.
Of course, the opportunity for double dipping would provide a
significant incentive for foreign governments to adopt their own interest
allocation rules or other thin capitalization rules to prevent debt dumping
that eats away at their tax base.60 Related-party loans, no longer a threat to
the U.S. tax base, are now a heightened threat to foreign countries because
debt formerly attracted to the United States for tax reasons will now be
attracted to affiliates in their jurisdictions.
IV. GROSS PROFITS AS AN ALLOCATION FACTOR
Up until now it has been assumed for computational ease that the rate of
return on assets has been equal for all assets. Under this assumption,
because assets and gross income remain in strict proportion to each other,
using assets as the allocation factor is exactly the same as using gross
profits, defined as profits before interest deductions. In the real world,
however, there are two distinct benefits to using gross profits as an
allocation factor instead of assets.
A. Simplification Benefits
Measuring assets for purposes of allocating interest can be
problematic.61 It is generally believed that using the market value of assets
is more accurate than using tax basis, but determining market value can be
costly and nevertheless still lead to disputes with the Internal Revenue
Service.62 Current allocation rules, used for computing foreign tax credit
limitations, allow multinationals the option of using market value or tax
basis.63
In addition to issues of valuation, assets must be valued at a point in
time.64 In many cases, particularly where a multinational has experienced

59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Martin A. Sullivan, An Automatic Brake on Profit Shifting in a Territorial System, 67 TAX
NOTES INT’L 502, 504 (2012) [hereinafter An Automatic Brake].
62. Id.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(g)(ii) (as amended in 2012).
64. An Automatic Brake, supra note 61, at 504.
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large changes—for example, after an acquisition—valuing assets at a single
point in time can lead to misleading result if that value is assumed to hold
for the entire year.65 This problem can be ameliorated by using averages at
multiple points in time, but this increases compliance costs. 66
If gross interest is used to allocate interest instead of assets, neither
valuation problems nor problems of dating valuation arise.67 So, if only for
purposes of reducing complexity and opportunities for manipulation of asset
totals used in allocation formulas, interest allocation by gross profits is
preferable to interest allocation by assets.
B. Reduction of Incentive for Aggressive Transfer Pricing
Under normal circumstances, any multinational that shifts profits out of
the United States reduces its worldwide taxes by:
(tus – tf)*X
where X is the shifted amount, tus is the U.S. statutory rate, and tf is the
foreign statutory rate.68
Under rules where interest is allocated in proportion to gross profit,
profit shifting through transfer pricing adjustment has a direct effect on
domestic interest deductions.69 For example, if a U.S. manufacturer shifts
profits to Ireland by raising the transfer price of goods manufactured in
Ireland and sold to its U.S. parent, it will reduce deductible interest in the
United States. The benefit of shifting profits to a low-tax jurisdiction is
offset by a reduction in interest expense allocated to the United States.
In algebraic terms, if interest is allocated using gross profits, the amount
of deductible domestic interest is:
(GPus/GPww)*r*Dww
where GPus is domestic profits, GPww is worldwide gross profits, r is the
interest rate on borrowing, and Dww is a multinational’s worldwide external
debt.70 Worldwide intra-company debt nets to zero.71 This expression can
be re-arranged to:
GPus*(r*Dww /GPww)72
The term in parentheses is the ratio of worldwide interest expense to gross
profits, which we will call v.73 It follows that U.S. tax can be expressed as:

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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Tus = tus*(1-v)*GPus
where tus is the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate.74 In this case, a shift of
profit out of the United States changes U.S. tax by:
-tus*(1-v)*X
The effect on foreign tax depends on whether foreign jurisdictions have
adopted similar rules.75 If there is multilateral adoption of these interest
allocation rules, the effect of profits shifting on the amount of foreign taxes
is:
tf*(1-v)*X
where tf is the foreign statutory corporate tax rate.76 In this case, the overall
effect of profits shifting on multinational taxes is:
[tus- tf]*(1-v)*X77
As is the case without allocation rules, the benefit of profit shifting is a
function of the difference between the U.S. and foreign statutory, but now
that benefit is reduced as the multinational’s interest expense increases.
Returning to the example of the prior section (where v is 0.5),78 if US MNC
shifts profit into Source, the tax benefit per $100 of shifted profit is reduced
from $20 without allocation rules to $10 with allocation of interest by gross
profits.79
If the foreign jurisdictions do not adopt the allocation rule, the effect on
foreign tax of profits shifting is:
tf*X80
And the overall effect of shifting profits on a multinational’s tax is:
[tus*(1-v)- tf ]*X81
Allocation by gross profits adopted unilaterally is an even better
deterrent to aggressive transfer pricing than allocation by gross profit
adopted multilaterally.82 With unilateral adoption of interest allocation rules
by gross profits, the tax benefit of less profit in the United States is reduced
and the tax burden of new profit in a foreign jurisdiction is left unchanged.
Again, returning to the example of the prior section, if US MNC shifts profit
into Source, the tax benefit per $100 of shifted profit is reduced from $20

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.
See infra tbl.4, col. 3.
An Automatic Brake, supra note 61, at 503–04.
Id. at 504.
Id.
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without allocation rules to $2.5 with unilateral adoption of allocation rules
by gross profits.83 Other examples are shown in Table 4 below.84 Among
the results, the table shows that adoption of the interest allocation rule by
gross assets on a unilateral basis can in certain circumstances actually turn
the tide and create an incentive for multinational corporations to shift profits
into the United States from low-tax jurisdictions—even if the United States
has the highest corporate tax rate in the world.85
TABLE 4
Incentive for Profit Shifting without Interest Allocation and
with Interest Allocation by Gross Profits
Worldwide Ratio of Interest to Gross Profit (v)

0
0.25
0.5
0.75
Tax Reduction per $100 Shifted out of the
United States

Foreign Statutory Tax Rate = 15%
Without allocation rule

20.00

20.00

20.00

20.00

Multilateral allocation by gross profit

20.00

15.00

10.00

5.00

Unilateral allocation by gross profit

20.00

11.25

2.50

-6.25

Foreign Statutory Tax Rate = 25%
Without allocation rule

10.00

10.00

10.00

10.00

Multilateral allocation by gross profit

10.00

8.00

6.67

5.00

Unilateral allocation by gross profit

10.00

3.00

-1.67

-7.50

C. Comparison to Allocation by Gross Assets
Interest allocation by assets could share some of the salutary effects on
transfer pricing of interest allocation by gross assets. That is, allocation by
assets in some circumstances may also blunt some of the advantages of
transfer pricing relative to a system without interest allocation. This will
occur if outbound profit shifting causes an increase in foreign assets.
Probably the most important example of this is the transfer of valuable
intangible assets outside the United States in order to shift profits out of the
United States. It is unlikely, however, that the transferred asset will have a
tax or book basis commensurate with its real value, given that the initial
buy-in payments (with which the foreign affiliate acquires the asset from the
parent) are generally small and subsequent payments for maintaining and

83.
84.
85.
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enhancing the assets routinely are not capitalized. Therefore, the reduction
in domestic interest deductions from shifting intangible assets when assets
are the allocation factor will be less than the reduction when gross profits is
used as the allocation factor.
More generally, while there is always a tight relationship between
transfer pricing and the amount of deductible interest when the allocation
factor is gross profits, there may be no relationship when assets is the
allocation factor. For example, a foreign subsidiary charging a U.S. parent
for services need not result in any shift in foreign assets.
V. SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
In a world where all nations employ territorial systems of taxation, the
absence of interest allocation rules enlarges the incentive for multinationals
domiciled in high-tax countries to invest in low-tax countries.86 It also gives
competitive advantage to multinationals located in high-tax countries
relative to multinationals from low-tax countries to invest outside their home
jurisdiction.87
Interest allocation rules reduce (but do not eliminate) multinationals’
incentives to invest abroad.88 In addition, multilateral adoption of interest
allocation rules equalizes effective tax rates of all multinationals with
identical financial structures investing in the same jurisdiction.89 In other
words, multinationals face a level playing field wherever they compete with
multilateral adoption of interest allocation rules.
If the United States unilaterally adopts interest allocation rules, U.S.
multinationals can restore much of the economic value of interest limited in
the United States by shifting borrowing outside the United States,
particularly if borrowing is shifted to another high-tax jurisdiction.90 In fact,
U.S. corporations will seek to locate as much debt and deduct as much
interest as possible outside the United States because the relocation of debt
will reduce foreign taxes without having any adverse effect on U.S. taxes.
This is a favorable outcome for U.S. multinationals. It will, however, likely
drive other nations to adopt interest allocation rules (or thin capitalization
rules with similar effects).91 Because multilateral adoption of interest
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 8, at 771; see also supra Part II.
See infra tbl.1; see also supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.C.
Interest Allocation Rules, supra note 58, at 1100; see also supra Part III.A.
Interest Allocation Rules, supra note 58; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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allocation rules has many favorable economic features and because usually it
is difficult to get nations to coordinate their tax policies, the catalytic effect
of unilateral adoption on other nations is a welcome development.
Allocating interest by gross profit will produce largely the same
favorable effects as interest allocation by assets, but with two added
benefits: (1) a reduction in administrative and compliance costs and (2) a
reduction in the incentive to shift profits out of the United States.92 This
latter effect will reduce revenue losses from shifting due to aggressive
transfer pricing.93 This effect is in addition to increased revenue from
reduced profit shifting due to borrowing by U.S. parents from their foreign
affiliates.94
All of this leads to the policy recommendation that if the United States
moves to a territorial system, it should adopt an interest allocation rule with
gross profits as the allocation factor. This eliminates the policy justification
for the 5 percent haircut in the Camp plan. And in general, no additional
thin capitalization rules would be needed. The exception might be for
foreign multinationals investing in the United States when it is difficult for
the Internal Revenue Service to gain access to records necessary to allocate
interest on a worldwide basis.
What about a limitation on interest similar to the percentage of adjusted
taxable income test in the Camp plan? Except as a substitute for an interest
allocation rule for foreign multinationals in the United States, there is no
international tax policy justification for this limit once a meaningful interest
allocation rule is in place. There may be, however, a good reason to limit
interest deductions generally, especially if revenue gained from limiting
deductions is used to lower rates, in order to eliminate the corporate taxes
favoritism of debt over equity.95 Following this line of reasoning, however,
would lead to the imposition of a percentage of taxable adjusted income
limitation on all firms, both purely domestic and multinational. That is a
topic for another article.

92. An Automatic Brake, supra note 61, at 504; see also supra Parts IV.A–B.
93. See supra Part IV.B
94. See supra Parts IV.B–C.
95. The Obama Administration has suggested limits on the deduction of interest as one of a
menu of options of a corporate tax reform plan that would reduce the corporate tax rate to 28%. THE
WHITE HOUSE AND THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
TAX REFORM 10 (2012) (“Additional steps like reducing the deductibility of interest for corporations
should be considered as part of a reform plan.”); see also Martin A. Sullivan, Treat Corporate
Interest Deductions Like Any Tax Expenditure, 136 TAX NOTES 631 (2012); Robert C. Pozen &
Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207
(2012).
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VI. APPENDICES
TABLE 1
Effect of Interest Allocation Rules on US MNC’s Choice of
Domestic versus Foreign Investment
A. Without Interest Allocation Rules
US MNC
New Domestic Investment
Before
After
Change
Total Gross Profit
200
300
100
Total Interest
100
150
Domestic
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 35%
Foreign
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 15%
Total Tax
Marginal ETR

US MNC
New Foreign Investment
Before
After
Change
200
300
100
100
150

100

200

100

100

50
50
17.5

100
100
35

50
50
17.5

100
0
0

100

100

100

200

50
50
7.5

50
50
7.5

50
50
7.5

50
150
22.5

25

42.5

25

22.5

17.5
17.5%

B. With Interest Allocation Rules
US MNC
New Domestic Investment
Before
After
Change
Total Income
200
300
100
Total Interest
100
150

US MNC
New Foreign Investment
Before
After
Change
200
300
100
100
150

Domestic
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Home Tax Rate
Tax @ 35%

100
0.5
50
50
0.35
17.5

200
0.67
100
100
0.35
35

100
0.5
50
50
0.35
17.5

100
0.33
50
50
0.35
17.5

Foreign
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 15%

100
0.5
50
50
7.5

100
0.33
50
50
7.5

100
0.5
50
50
7.5

200
0.67
100
100
15

25

42.5

25

32.5

Total Tax
Marginal ETR

17.5
17.5%

-2.5
-2.5%

7.5
7.5%
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TABLE 2
Effect of Interest Allocation Rules on
Competitiveness of US versus Foreign MNC
A. Without Interest Allocation Rules
US MNC
New Source Country Investment
Before
After
Change
Total Gross Profit
200
300
100
Total Interest
100
150
Home Country
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 35%
Source Country
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 15%
Total Tax
Marginal ETR

Foreign MNC
New Source Country Investment
Before
After
Change
200
300
100
100
150

100

100

100

100

50
50
17.5

100
0
0

50
50
12.5

100
0
0

100

200

100

200

50
50
7.5

50
150
22.5

50
50
7.5

50
150
22.5

25

22.5

20

22.5

-2.5
-2.5%

2.5
2.5%

B. With Interest Allocation Rules

Total Income
Total Interest
Home Country
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit

US MNC
New Source Country Investment
Before
After
Change
200
300
100
100
150

Foreign MNC
New Source Country Investment
Before
After
Change
200
300
100
100
150

Tax @ 35%

100
0.5
50
50
0.35
17.5

100
0.33
50
50
0.35
17.5

100
0.5
50
50
0.25
12.5

100
0.33
50
50
0.25
12.5

Source Country
Gross Profit
Allocation Fraction
Interest Deduction
Taxable Profit
Tax @ 15%

100
0.5
50
50
7.5

200
0.67
100
100
15

100
0.5
50
50
7.5

200
0.67
100
100
15

25

32.5

20

27.5

Total Tax
Marginal ETR

1364

7.5
7.5%

7.5
7.5%

